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The study has the purpose of analysing the degree of real earnings management in 
state and non-state-owned firms, taking into account the potential effects of crisis periods. 
The sample is composed of 15.147 companies, 995 state-owned and 14.152 non-state-
owned, from 22 European countries and 8 industry sectors, from the years of 2008 to 
2017. Following the Roychowdhury (2006) methodology the results show that state-
owned firms have a higher degree of real earnings management when compared with non-
state-owned. Additionally, the size, debt and growth opportunities were seen to influence 
the practice of real earnings management. Finally, the results show that the crisis periods 
have a positive influence on the practice of real earnings management.  
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O  propósito deste  estudo é analisar o grau de gestão de resultados com base em 
operações reais nas empresas estatais e não estatais, tendo em consideração os potênciais 
efeitos de períodos de crise. A amostra é composta de 15.147 empresas, 995 das quais 
estatais, de 22 países euopeus,  8 setores de indústria e  durante os anos de 2008 a 2017. 
De acordo com a metodologia desenvolvida por Roychowdhury (2006), os resultados 
demonstram que as empresas privadas praticam mais gestão de resultados com base em 
operações reais, quando comparadas com as empresas não estatais. Adicionalmente, a 
dimensão, o endividamento e as oportunidades de crescimento   de uma empresa foram 
vistas como fatores de influencia na pratica de gestão de resultados. Finalmente, os 
resultados demonstram que os períodos de crise têm uma influência positiva na prática de 
gestão de resultados. 
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The purpose of  accounting is to inform its users and to facilitate their decision process 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Accounting standards were created to promote transparent 
and reliable information that portraits the true and appropriate image of a given company. 
It is important to state, however, that these standards are not rigid. In fact, they possess 
some degree of flexibility, allowing companies to make choices in regards to the 
measurement, recognition and disclosure of their assets and liabilities. 
Earnings have been demonstrated to play an important role, since they reflect a firm’s 
economic performance for a specific period (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005). 
Managers use the flexibility of the accounting standards to manipulate the reported 
earnings, with the purpose of demonstrating a positive image of the firm, to accomplish 
specific objectives and to meet analyst expectations. This practice is called Earnings 
management (EM) and it is the focus of this study. 
The practice of earnings management has a rich body of literature. This is mainly due 
to the financial scandals that have occurred since the beginning of the 2000’s, as 
evidenced by Enron and WorldCom. In fact, most research has focused on the practice of 
accruals-based earnings management (AEM), which comprises the use of accrual 
accounting to manipulate the company’s earnings (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
Conversely, real earnings management (REM) uses the company’s activities as a way of 
changing the disclosed earnings. Both practices have been shown to have a negative 
impact on a company’s future performance (Gunny, 2005; Cupertino, Martinez and Costa 
Jr, 2016) and it has also been shown to exist a trade-off between them (Zang, 2012).  
The work of authors such as Graham et al. (2005), and Bruns et al. (1990), 
demonstrated that financial executives indicate a greater willingness to manipulate 
earnings through real activities (REM) rather than accruals (AEM). Also, market and 
institutional pressures to meet earnings targets such as zero earnings, previous periods’ 
earnings and analyst forecasts act as an incentive to the use of these practices (Graham et 
al. 2005).  
In addition, state ownership is associated with decreasing quality in reported earnings 
(Ben-Nasr, Boubakri and Cosset, 2015). Taking this into account, it is important to study 
if there is a distinction in the degree of these practices when considering state and non-




state-owned companies. Therefore, the objective of this study is to determine if there is a 
greater extent of REM in SOEs or NSOEs.   
The study also took into account the possible effects of economic stability in REM, 
given the fact that it has been shown that periods of economic crisis are associated with a 
significant decrease in the degree of EM (Filip and Raffournier, 2014). 
In fact, the study of the behaviour of SOEs, particularly during periods of economic 
crisis, is very important, as they face greater scrutiny and pressure to perform. Contrarily, 
one can state that stricter tax regulations, that are commonly introduced during these 
periods, do not weigh as heavily on state-owned firms as they do on their non-state-owned 
counterparts. This dichotomy leads to the increased interest and importance of studying 
how the extent of REM may differ between these two types of ownership structures. 
The sample of this study is composed of 15.147 companies, 995 SOEs and 14.152 
NSOEs, from 22 countries and 8 sectors. The Roychowdhury (2006) methodology was 
used to develop the measurement of REM practices taking into account a firm’s cash-
flow from operations.  
The main motivation of this study is related to the fact that this practice has been 
shown to be increasingly used by companies to manipulate their reported earnings. 
Additionally, it is important to study the behaviours of SOEs and compare them with their 
non-state-owned counterparts. Finally, the lack of any convergence in the existing body 
of literature, creates an interest to further investigate the topic.  
The study is divided in 7 parts. Chapter 2 contains the literature review, followed by 
the hypothesis development in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 contains the explanation of the model 
and its different variables, chapter 5 has the results of the statistical analysis, chapter 6 










2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Earnings management 
The earnings reported by a company in a given period are a reflection of its 
economic performance and contribute to the decision process of its many users (Graham 
et al. 2005). As such, the management of reported earnings is used to modify financial 
information in an attempt to transmit a specific message.  
According to Healy et al. (1999) “Earnings management occurs when managers 
use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance 
of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
practices”. EM can also be defined as “…a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, 
say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process) …” (Schipper, 1989). 
However, it is important to refer that earnings management should be within the barriers 
of the accounting rules (Dechow and Sloan, 1996) and should not be confused with any 
fraudulent activity. Specifically, fraud occurs when the actions practiced go beyond the 
limits of what is defined in the accounting rules. Besides leading to a loss of precision in 
assessing the economic situation of a firm, it also creates asymmetry of information 
between managers and shareholders. In addition, it has been linked to hindrance of a 
firm's future economic performance and financial stability (Gunny, 2005; Cupertino et 
al., 2016). 
As previously presented, there are two types of earnings management practices. 
AEM, or accruals earnings management, refers to the use of accrual accounting to 
manipulate a company’s reported earnings. As Dechow et al. (2000) stated, this practice 
is achieved by the choices of methods and accounting estimates that depend on the 
manager’s judgement. On the other hand, REM, or real earnings managements, refers to 
the use of real activities as a way to manipulate the disclosed earnings. Concretely, 
Roychowdhury (2006) defined it as “departures from normal operational practices 
motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain 
financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations.” 
There are multiple ways to manage earnings through operating activities. 
Executives may use price discounts to temporarily increase sales, overproduction to 




report decreased cost of goods sold, and reduction of discretionary expenditures to 
improve reported margins (Roychowdhury, 2006). Other methods of manipulating 
earnings using real activities are acceleration of sales, alterations in shipment schedules, 
and delaying R&D and other discretionary expenses (Dechow et al., 2000; Gunny, 2005). 
Additionally, there is evidence that investors' expectations, as reflected in stock prices, 
do not recognize the consequences of myopic R&D investment and the strategic timing 
of asset sales, which may explain why the practice of REM has become more prevalent 
when compared with AEM (Gunny, 2005).  
The relationship between financial executives and these two types of practices are 
quite different, as evidenced by the work of authors such as Graham et al. (2005) With 
the use of a questionnaire, they found that executives are more willing to manipulate 
earnings through real activities rather than accruals, and that they prefer reducing 
discretionary expenditures and/or capital investments than engaging in other 
manipulating methods.  
Additionally, Bruns et al. (1990) surveyed managers about the morality of 
earnings management and found that, on average, they view managing short-term 
earnings by accounting methods as significantly less acceptable than accomplishing the 
same ends by changing or manipulating operating decisions or procedures, suggesting 
that managers prefer to manipulate earnings using REM practices. They also found that 
increasing profits by offering extended credit terms is seen as less acceptable than selling 
excess assets or using overtime to increase shipments.  
A possible reason for the increased willingness to use REM practices instead of 
AEM is that accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditor or regulatory scrutiny 
and there is increased risk in relying solely in this type of earnings manipulation 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). Roychowdhury (2006), showed that auditors and regulatory 
bodies need to broaden the types of procedures and areas of focus as a way to guarantee 
the decrease of these practices. Zang (2012) also showed the influence of accounting 
scrutiny on EM practices. Specifically, the author provides evidence for how managers 
trade off REM and AEM. When AEM is constrained due to a greater level of scrutiny of 
accounting practices post-SOX, firms use REM to a greater extent. The results also show 
that firms use more AEM and less REM practices, when the latter is costlier for them, 




either due to having a less competitive status in the industry or by being in worse financial 
conditions. This, again, shows a clear trade-off between these two types of practices. 
As seen above, the introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act played an important 
role in the decision process of financial executives. Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) found 
that AEM had increased steadily from 1987 until the passage of the SOX act in 2002, and 
then decreased significantly. Contrarily, the level of REM practices declined prior to SOX 
and increased significantly after its passage, which suggests that firms switched from 
AEM to REM after the passage of this act.  
2.2 The incentives of earnings management practices 
Apart from SOX, there are other factors that influence the degree of REM. As 
previously indicated, the incentive of meeting earnings targets, such as the earnings 
forecast of analysts, plays a major role in influencing managers’ willingness to practice 
earnings management (Graham et al. 2005) . This shows how market pressures and other 
institutional factors can shape firm’s incentives to report earnings that reflect their 
intended economic performance. However, non and state-owned firms respond quite 
differently to these pressures. Burgstahler et al. (2006) found that NSOEs exhibit higher 
level of EM in comparison to SOEs, and that non and state-owned firms responded 
differently to institutional factors, such as outsider investor protection, and capital market 
structure.  
Another incentive for the use of earnings management practices is the need to 
avoid earnings decreases and losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). The authors 
presented two possibilities to explain this result. First, managers might want to avoid 
reporting earnings decrease and losses in order to decrease the costs imposed on the firm 
in transaction with shareholders. Second, they postulate that, based on prospect theory, 
managers might have an aversion to absolute and/or relative losses. Specifically, prospect 
theory postulates that individuals’ value functions are concave for gains and convex for 
losses, where gains and losses are measured, not in absolute terms, but rather relative to 
their reference point. Additionally, it was found that the desire to raise external financing 
at lower costs, as a way to avoid debt covenant restrictions, could be a major incentive 
towards the practice of earnings management (Dechow et al., 1996). The desire to 
decrease a company’s financing costs propel managers to present an improved version of 
its economic performance.  




One specific practice of earnings management is income smoothing. This practice 
is defined as “the deliberate dampening of fluctuations about some level of earnings 
which is considered to be normal for the firm” (Barnea, Ronen and Sadan, 1976). This 
behaviour can be influenced by the company’s ownership structure, the executive’s 
incentive structure and by the firm’s profitability (Carlson and Bathala, 1997). 
Specifically, the authors found that the lower the proportion of inside ownership the 
higher the probability of a firm being an income smoother, and that firms with higher 
proportions of institutional ownership and debt financing have a greater willingness to 
manipulate their earnings using these practices. This shows that, the wider the dispersion 
of stock ownership, the greater the possibility of income smoothing and provides a greater 
understanding of how the executive’s compensation can influence their willingness to 
alter earnings.  
When referring managers’ incentive to prioritize their job security it is also 
important to analyse how their tenure can have an effect to the degree of earnings 
management. Ali and Zhang (2015)  predicted that, in the early years of their service, 
when markets were more uncertain of their ability, they have a greater incentive to 
overstate earnings to favourably influence others’ perception of their capabilities. 
Therefore, as expected, there is more overstatement of earnings in the early years than in 
the later years of service, and that this overstatement increases reported return on assets 
by about 25%, on average.  
As seen, the ownership structure of a company may have an effect on the 
capability of financial executives to perform earnings management practices. 
Additionally, poor oversight of management through weak governance structures has 
been shown to be an important catalyst for earnings manipulation (Dechow et al., 1996). 
This provides an understanding of how ownership and governance structures can play an 
important role in the process to achieve greater quality of reported earnings. 
As mentioned, a consequence of earnings management is the increased asymmetry 
of information between managers and shareholders. Nevertheless, in economies where 
there already exists a certain degree of asymmetry, and where there are high monitoring 
costs, these types of practices are more frequently used (Ferreira, Carvalho and Pinho, 
2011). Contrarily, economies with dispersed ownership, strong investor protection, and 
large stock markets exhibit lower levels of earnings management (Leuz, Nanda and 




Wysocki, 2003). In fact, the ownership structure and concentration has a close 
relationship with the degree of earnings management. Ding, Zhang and Zhang (2007) 
found that these two characteristics follow an inverted U shape pattern: when the 
ownership concentration is low, the agency cost is high and, therefore, the degree of 
earnings management is greater. Notwithstanding, when the ownership concentration 
reaches a high level, large shareholders become the true owners of the firm, and are more 
likely to seek to preserve its future growth potential, thus having an alignment effect on 
the information asymmetry. 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) found that a strong legal system could be associated with 
less earnings manipulation in either state or non-state-owned firms. Additionally, these 
authors found that these types of practices are more pronounced in countries that have 
weaker legal systems and enforcement, which confirms the central role of institutions and 
their enforcement mechanisms. Their evidence shows that countries with highly 
developed equity markets lead to a decrease earnings management practices by state-
owned firms. This demonstrates that strong capital markets improve earnings 
informativeness. In contrast, strong capital markets might also incentivize firms to launch 
an IPO (initial public offering) or even an SEO (seasonal public offering), which have 
been linked to income-increasing earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell and Goodacre, 2011). Another consequence of increased 
market strength is that firms might be incentivized to participate in income-decreasing 
real earnings management before making a stock repurchase (Cooper, Downes and Rao, 
2018), in the attempt to decrease the stock price, allowing them to repurchase their shares 
at a lower value. This demonstrates that strong markets might have positive and negative 
effects on the degree of earnings management practiced by companies. 
There is evidence that the economic conditions of a given country can play a major 
role in defining REM. Filip et al. (2014) found that there is a significant decrease in 
income smoothing and an improvement of accrual quality during the crisis period. 
Countries with economic hardships usually have stricter rules and increased tax burdens, 
which restricts a company’s capacity to manipulate their reported earnings. Nonetheless, 
it can be stated that in these situations the focus of EM practices can be the reduction of 
taxes to be paid. The authors also show that national characteristics such as law 




enforcement and corporate governance quality can explain country differences in income 
smoothing.  
2.3 Real earnings management 
Roychowdhury (2006) found that that there is a negative association between 
institutional ownership and the presence of sophisticated investors with the extent of 
REM practices. This also demonstrates how investor scrutiny and board structure can 
have an important effect on the quality of financial information. 
Regarding this idea, Ferreira et al. (2011) provided evidence of how board 
monitoring imposes short-term pressures on managers, which in turn leads to managerial 
short-sighted decisions and opportunistic behaviour of REM. This contradicts the 
findings presented in the previous paragraph, and leads to the insight of the possible 
positive and negative effects of board and investor scrutiny. In addition, Ge (2009) 
postulates that managers tend to manipulate earnings via changing the timing and/or scale 
of the operating transactions to obtain personal benefit, and that these activities are sub-
optimal and detrimental to firm value. 
Aggressive REM practices have been linked to reduced future operating 
performance (Gunny, 2005) and a negative impact on ROA, which demonstrates that the 
manipulation of real operating activities has a negative relation to future returns 
(Cupertino et al., 2016). Specifically it is possible to determine that aggressive price 
discounts, which are used to increase sales volumes and meet short-term earnings targets, 
can lead customers to form incorrect expectations of future discounts, which implies a 
lower margin on future sales (Roychowdhury, 2006). Additionally, the increased 
overproduction can generate excess inventories that have to be sold in subsequent periods 
and imposes greater inventory holding costs for the company (Roychowdhury, 2006).   
The negative impact related to practicing real activities manipulation is not only 
associated with future earnings. Greiner, Kohlbeck and Smith (2017) showed that 
aggressive REM practices, excluding abnormal reductions in SG&A, are associated with 
high current and future audit fees. Their interpretation is that this relationship is driven, 
in part, by the increase of the perceived business risk. Risk, in fact, plays a major role in 
the definition of future auditing fees, and on the extent of procedures to be done during 
the audit engagement. Additionally, there is evidence that REM is linked to negative 




implications for auditors, showing a higher likelihood of auditor resignations when 
aggressive REM is observed (Kim, Yongtae; Park, 2014).  
The board characteristics, such as independence, size, frequency of meetings and 
CEO/Chair duality, have been shown to be associated with the reduction of REM 
practices (Zgarni, Halioui and Zehri, 2014). This demonstrates, yet again, that the board 
plays a key role in the reduction of these practices. Additionally, it was shown that key 
subordinate executives have the incentive and ability to constraint the extent of real 
earnings management (Cheng, Lee and Shevlin, 2016). The authors, found that the effect 
of internal governance is stronger in more complex firms, where key subordinate 
executives have a more important role, stronger in firms where the CEO is less powerful 
and weaker in firms where the capital markets benefit of meeting earnings benchmarks is 
higher. This is consistent with the notion that redistributing the responsibilities between 
the subordinate executives, instead of focusing them on the CEO, can play an important 
role in the reduction of REM practices and the improvement of internal governance. 
In fact, internal governance has been proven more effective in constraining real 
earnings management for firms where the chief executive officers have greater career 
concerns and, therefore, have a greater willingness to manage earnings (Cheng et al., 
2016). Lastly, Huang and Sun (2017) showed that there is a clear relation between 
managerial ability and REM. Specifically, the authors showed that the most able 
managers use less activities-based earnings management, and that they reduce the 
negative impact of REM on the future firm performance. They also found that high-ability 
managers appear to choose accrual-based earnings management over REM, which 
contraries the information presented by Graham et al. (2005) and Bruns et al. (1990).  
2.4 The influence of state ownership and political connections on earnings management 
Considering that the topic of this study regards the extent of REM practices in 
SOEs, and its comparison to NSOEs, it is important to understand how political influences 
and state ownership can have an effect on the quality of the reported earnings. In fact, 
unlike typical shareholders, governments tend to achieve social goals and short-term 
political objectives rather than maximizing profits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).  
There is evidence that state ownership is associated with lower earnings quality 
while foreign ownership is associated with higher earnings quality (Ben-Nasr et al., 
2015). Specifically, these authors found that foreign ownership is associated with 




improved earnings quality in countries with better government stability and lower risk of 
government expropriation.  
Profitability and operating efficiency has also been shown to decrease as a 
consequence of state-ownership (Boubakri et al., 2009). However, the authors state that 
this effect can be moderated by the presence of sound institutional and political 
environment. In addition, they postulate that, although state ownership has negative 
effects on profitability, these are less pronounced in countries with right-wing 
governments as opposed to left-wing governments. This provides a deeper understanding 
on how different political perspective can shape the behaviours and decisions of 
companies. 
Following privatization, governments have been shown to continue to be the 
controlling shareholder of at least 28% of firms (Boubakri et al., 2009) specifically they 
maintain a tight grip and close oversight on strategic industries as they either hold golden 
shares or appoint politicians on the boards of newly privatized firms. This need to 
maintain a tight grip, following privatization, is evidence that governments want to 
continue to have an influence in the decision process of privatized firms. These authors 
also demonstrate that, following privatization, companies usually face a period of 
significant improvements in profitability, operating efficiency and capital expenditures 
(Boubakri et al., 2009). In addition, it has been proven that politicians are more likely to 
privatize inefficient firms, since they continue to give bribes in exchange of subsidies 
(Shleifer et al., 1994).  
Politically connected firms are defined by Zang (2006) as firms that, at some 
point, had, as a major shareholder or top director, a member of parliament, a minister or 
head of state, or a firm that is tightly related to either a politician or party, have also been 
proven to have a negative effect on the quality of reported accounting information 
(Chaney, Faccio and Parsley, 2011). Chaney, Faccio and Parsley (2011) argued two 
possible reasons for the negative effect on the quality of financial information. First, it 
may be that connected companies intentionally disclose information with lower quality, 
in the attempt to mislead investors, and for the benefit of insiders. Second, the protection 
these companies enjoy may lead them to devote less time and care to manage their 
discretionary accruals and expenses. This shows that the negative effect of low earnings 
quality on the cost of debt only influences non-politically connected firms, which points 




out that connected companies face little negative consequences for their lower quality 
disclosures.  
Politically connected firms have also been shown to be less likely to have publicly 
traded debt or equity securities abroad. This suggests that connections and global 
financing are, in fact, substitutes (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). The authors’ 
explanation is that well connected firms have access to preferential financing at home and 
therefore do not need to access foreign capital markets. Another potential explanation is 
that these companies dislike the increased transparency and scrutiny that comes from 
having publicly traded securities. This shows that politicians exert their influence and 
allow companies to more easily access financing opportunities that could not be achieved 
abroad.  
It has been shown that politicians follow EM practices in such a way as to avoid 
reporting negative earnings (Ferreira et al., 2013). In fact, politicians aim to report 
earnings that will not be interpreted by citizens as excessive, which shows that they aim 
to demonstrate that the public resources, for which they are responsible, are managed 
according to economic and efficiency principles. The results obtained by these authors 
also support the idea that, during pre-election period, there is a higher predisposition to 
manage earnings, specifically when there are strong political competitors. This 
demonstrates that politicians, in the same way as managers, are incentivized by their 
personal job security. 
 Companies who are politically connected also have been shown to be more likely 
to substitute REM for AEM than non-connected firms (Braam et al., 2015). In particular, 
when public monitoring and the risk of detection increases, firms have a larger incentive 
to substitute REM for AEM strategies, with the intention to manage and mask the gains 
derived from their political connections (Braam et al., 2015). In addition, the results show 
that political connections play a significant role in explaining the variance in firm’s 
choices of earnings management strategies. When compared to non-connected firms, 
these are more likely to substitute relatively costlier and less detectable earnings 
management strategies for AEM strategies. This is in line with the existent literature 
regarding managers’ preference for real earnings management. 




3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT: 
3.1 State ownership and REM 
As seen, state ownership has been shown to negatively affect the quality of reported 
earnings (Ben-Nasr et al., 2015), and is associated with a higher degree of earnings 
management practices. Authors, such as Ferreira et al. (2013), have demonstrated that 
these practices occur in SOEs with the intention to avoid reporting negative earnings, as 
a way to signal proper management of public resources. Apart from SOEs, firms that have 
strong political connections have also been demonstrated to have low quality reported 
earnings (Chaney, Faccio and Parsley, 2011). One possible explanation may be that 
political connections provide a sense of protection for these firms, which may lead them 
to devote less time in preparing their financial information. Additionally, Bai et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that having the largest shareholder be the government has a negative effect 
on market valuation. Contrarily, having high concentration of non-controlling 
shareholding and issuing shares to foreign investors positively contributes to an increase 
in a given company’s valuation. 
Ding, et al. (2007), examined the relationship, in Chinese listed firms, between 
earnings management practices and the ownership structure, particularly if the company 
is non-state-owned or state-owned. The authors provide evidence that the earnings 
management practices of Chinese listed firms are influenced by these firms’ ownership 
concentration. Their analysis shows that non-state-owned listed firms favour earnings 
boosting methods more than their state-owned counterparts. Contrarily, Bai et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that EM practices are more prevalent in state-owned firms. The possible 
explanation provided by the authors is that SOEs have other goals besides the 
maximization of profit. The intention to maximize employability and social stability 
might lead the state to see these companies as means to fulfil their own objectives and 
demonstrate a positive performance. This will lead to a greater acceptability to these types 
of practices. 
This explanation follows the proposed justification presented by Shleifer et al. (1994), 
which argued that, unlike regular investors, governments tend to emphasize achieving 
social goals and short-term political objectives, instead of focusing on the maximization 
of profit. It is evident that job security plays a key role on the extent of EM practices.  




Contrary to these findings, Wang and Yung (2011), studied the impact of state 
ownership on earnings management using a panel sample of Chinese publicly traded 
firms and found lower levels of accrual-based earnings management among state-owned 
corporations than non-state firms even after controlling for tunnelling activities. For the 
authors, the fact that state enterprises have better earnings quality brings into question the 
conventional belief that state ownership is the root of all sorts of corporate inefficiencies. 
One possible explanation for this might be the fact that the government might have 
reduced the manager’s willingness to manipulate firm-specific information in state firms. 
Further investigation indicates that the divergence in earnings quality between SOEs and 
NSOEs becomes less evident as the economy becomes more and more market driven. 
In terms of the EM practices trade-off, Braam et al. (2015) have shown that politically 
connected firms are more likely to substitute REM for AEM, when compared with non-
connected firms. The authors postulate that this may be because these practices are less 
subjected to auditor scrutiny. This study also shows politically connected firms are more 
likely to substitute costlier and less detectable EM strategies for accrual-based EM 
strategies. This aligns with the given explanation and shows how political connection can 
explain the variance in firm’s choices of EM practices. Capalbo et al. (2014) also found 
evidence that the level of state ownership is positively correlated with accrual-based 
earnings management. 
Chen et al. (2011) examined how differences in audit quality affect earnings 
management and cost of equity capital for SOEs and NSOEs. The authors find that 
NSOEs exhibit a greater reduction in EM relative to SOEs when they employ auditors 
with greater quality. They also found that SOEs exhibit significantly lesser reduction in 
the cost of equity capital than their non-state-owned counterparts, when considering the 
work of high-quality auditors. 
Considering this, it is important to determine if there is an association between state 
owned companies and REM practices. Therefore, the main hypothesis of this study is: 
H1: There is an association between state ownership and real earnings management. 
According to Cohen et al., (2010), Zang (2012) and Zamri, Rahman and Isa (2013) 
the abnormal levels of cash-flow from operations are a consequence of mangers attempt 
to manipulate sales by the acceleration of sales timing and/or by granting increased price 




discounts. This in term will affect the CFO by increasing them in the short-term. 
Additionally, companies with higher abnormal levels of CFO are associated with higher 
degrees of REM practices.  
3.2 Financial crisis and REM 
As seen, the stability of an economy can influence the degree of earnings management 
practiced. As shown by Filip et al. (2014), there is a significant decrease in the practice 
of EM in periods of economic crisis. The authors claim that countries that undergo 
economic hardships usually have stricter rules and increased tax burden, which restricts 
a firm’s capacity to manipulate their reported earnings. Another potential explanation is 
the fact that the market is more tolerant to weaker financial performance, creating an 
incentive to report losses during these periods.  
However, Ferreira et al. (2013), argued that there is a lesser degree of tolerance 
towards state owned companies, during these periods, than there is to non-state held firms. 
This may be due to the fact that the firms are more stable and have an increasing pressure 
to properly manage public resources. Therefore, it is interesting to develop a deeper 
understanding of the effect of crisis periods on the extent of the earnings management 
practices by state-owned firms.  
The following hypothesis is intended to test this effect, as such:  
H2: There is an association between periods of economic crisis and the degree of 
REM practices.  
This hypothesis has the intent to determine if a positive association exists between 
periods of economic hardship and the degree of earnings manipulation practices. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Sample characterization 
The data has been extracted from the Amadeus databased and the selected time 
horizon is from 2008 to 2017. The study takes into consideration European state-owned 
and non-state held firms, with the exception of the financial, insurance and public 
administration industries. This follows the reasoning presented by Roychowdhury (2006).  




SOEs were only considered if the state controlled more than 20% of the existing 
shares. Additionally, there was the elimination of small non and state-owned firms, in the 
attempt to have a more balanced sampled. The criteria used for elimination follows the 
(Oecd, no date)recommendation 2003/361/EC of the European commission, in which the 
entity defines micro, small and medium-sized enterprises as having a total annual balance 
sheet not exceeding 43 Million euros.  
The sector segmentation followed the North American industry classification system 
(NAICS). In addition, the present study followed the guideline to preserve countries with, 
at least, 10 companies and, regarding the different sectors, there was the exclusion of 
sectors with less than 8 companies, as presented in Cohene et al. (2008). Finally, the 
outliers were excluded, considering the values between the percentile 1 and 99 of all the 
abnormal cash-flows.  
The final sample is composed by 15.147 companies, 995 SOEs and 14.152 NSOEs, 
from 22 countries and 8 sectors. The distribution of the overall sample demonstrates that 
the United Kingdom (24.90%) and France (13.3%) are the countries that are more 
represented in the sample. In terms of NSOEs, the United Kingdom (26.56%) remains the 
most represented country. Following the United Kingdom, France (14.2%), Denmark 
(13.22%) and Italy (11.66%) are the countries with biggest representation. In terms of 
SOEs, Sweden (64.42%), followed by Denmark (13.17%) and Belgium (12.36%) are the 
most represented countries – Appendix 1. 
The list of sectors defined by the NAICS code is available in appendix 2. Analysing 
this information is easy do see that the composition of the sample is similar when 
regarding non and state-owned companies. In terms of sectors we have NAICS 5 (48.0%) 
as the sector with the most representation, followed by NAICS 3 (17.0%) and NAICS 4 
(15.6%) - Appendix 3.  
In terms of listed companies, the United Kingdom (23,4%) and France (16,7%) are 
the most represented countries. Overall the number of publicly traded companies amounts 
to 10% of the sample. In regards to being audited by a Big4 firm, the United Kingdom 
(27,4%) and Sweden (13,5%) are the countries with the largest representation. All in all, 
the number of firms audited by the Big4 represent 56% of the sample – Appendix 4. 




4.2 The measures of REM 
This study follows the methodology used by Roychowdhury (2006) and applied in 
many other papers such as de Cohen et al. (2010), Zamri, Rahman and Isa (2013), Cohen 
et al.s (2008) and Gunny( 2010). Additionally, the Dechow et al. (1998)  methodology 
was used to derive normal levels of CFO for every firm-year. Deviations from the normal 
levels are termed abnormal CFO. The methodology is based on the analysis of abnormal 
levels of CFO. The calculation of the abnormal levels follows the formula: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙           1) 
The normal levels of these metrics, Roychowdhury (2006) follows the model 
developed by Dechow et al. (1998). In this model, cash-flow from operations will be 
expressed as a linear function of sales and changes in sales in the current period. As way 
to estimate the model, it is necessary to run the following cross-sectional regression for 
every year and industry: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1









+ 𝜀𝑡    2) 
 Where: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡: Cash flow from operations during period t; 
𝐴𝑡−1 : Total assets during the period t-1; 
𝑆𝑡     : Sales during the period t; 
∆𝑆𝑡   : Change in sales during the period t and t-1; 
𝜀𝑡      : Error 
According to Roychowdhury (2006), the model was divided by the lagged value of 
assets to control the potential differences in the size of a given company. 
The actual level of CFO was calculated using the following formula present in 
(Castelhano, 2014, master thesis): 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 =  𝑁𝐼𝑡 − (∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡)  3) 
Where: 
𝑁𝐼𝑡 = Net income of period t   




∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 = Changes in current assets 
∆𝐶𝐿𝑡 = Changes in current liabilities 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 = Changes in cash and cash equivalents 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 = Changes in short term debt 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡 = Depreciation and amortization of period t 
Finally, it is important to state that the measure of REM will be measured in terms of 
its absolute value. 
4.3 Empirical model 
The following model was used to study the association of state ownership and REM: 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  4) 
𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽7 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
In terms of explanatory variables, there are four dummy variables: 
𝑆𝑂𝐸: That presents the value “1” if the given company is state-owned or “0” if it is 
not state-owned; 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠: That presents the value “1” if the given period of analysis coincides with a 
year of financial crisis (which will be the years of 2009 to 2012) or “0” otherwise; 
𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑: That presents the value “1” if the given company is publicly traded or “0” 
otherwise. 
𝐵𝑖𝑔4: That presents the value “1” if the given company is audited by a big4 auditing 
firms and “0” otherwise.  
There is no clear consensus regarding the crisis period, however, in the European 
Commission Winter Report (2014), it is defined as the period between 2009 and 2012. In 
fact, the European commission regards that by 2013, Europe was already presenting signs 
of recovery from the crisis.  
Regarding the auditing firm, DeAngelo (1981) suggests that Big4 firms provide 
higher quality services, because they are subjected to greater disciplinary sanctions and 
have an increased pressure to maintain a good reputation. Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 




(2005) found a link between Big4 firms and a decreasing degree of earnings management 
practices. In regards to SOEs, Chen et al. (2011) found evidence that non-state-owned 
companies exhibit a greater reduction in EM relative do SOEs when they employ high-
quality auditors. Conversely, Chi, Lisic and Pevzner (2011) determined that Big4 auditing 
firms are associated with a greater degree of REM activities. A possible explanation might 
be given by Roychowdhury (2006) that defended that the greater willingness to use REM 
instead of AEM is that accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditor or regulatory 
scrutiny. This means that the higher scrutiny of AEM practices by Big4 auditing firms 
will lead to a greater willingness of REM and, therefore, these auditing firms will be 
greatly associated with these types of practices.  
Listed companies were shown to be subjected to increased scrutiny, leading to greater 
transparency in reported earnings (Leuz et al., 2006). However, Ding et al. (2007) have 
shown that listed firms were seen to favour earnings boosting methods more than state-
owned companies. Wang and Yung (2011), also found that publicly traded firms have 
higher levels of EM when compared with state-owned corporations. Therefore, it is 
interesting to study the relationship between listed firms and the extend of REM. 
A company’s size has been shown to have a possible relationship with the degree of 
REM practices, as seen in Watts L. and Zimmerman L. (1978)These authors state the 
increased size of a given company will lead them to be subject to greater regulatory 
scrutiny, leading to greater quality earnings and less REM practices. Likewise, Moses 
(1987) showed that bigger companies have a greater incentive for income smoothing 
behaviours. The author postulates that a firm’s size leads to a greater scrutiny by state and 
public entities. This creates a greater incentive to manage earnings as a way of minimizing 
the expected costs of a potential external intervention. Capalbo et al. (2014) also found 
evidence that EM practices in SOEs decreases with the firm size. On the other hand, 
authors such as Albrecht and Richardson (1990), Tendeloo et al. (2005), Sawan and 
Hamuda (2014) and Zgarni et. al (2014) provided evidence towards the non-existent 
relation between the size of a given company and the degree of earnings management. 
Additionally, Choi (2002) affirmed that smaller sized companies have a greater 
probability of managing earnings, in order to avoid losses. Size is measured as the 
logarithm of a company’s total assets. 




According to Zamri, Rahman and Isa (2013) debt has an effect on the extent of 
earnings management practices. The authors demonstrate that more indebted companies 
tend to have lower levels of REM. On the contrary, Carlson et al. (1997) and 
Roychowdhury (2006) state that there is a positive relationship between a firm’s debt 
level and the degree of earnings management practices. Finally, Zgarni et al. (2014) 
demonstrated that the practices of REM are not significantly associated with a company’s 
debt level. It is evident that there is no consensus in regards to the possible effects of debt, 
or even if these effects exist at all. Debt is measured as the sum of long and short-term 
non-operational liabilities divided by the total assets.  
According to Skinner and Sloan (2002), companies with growth opportunities are 
penalized by the stock market when they fail to accomplish forecasted earnings. 
Additionally, Butler, Leone and Willenborg (2004) demonstrated that growing companies 
can suffer pressures to maintain their profitability rate, or to maintain the stability of 
reported earnings, which may lead to earnings management. In fact, Tendeloo et al. 
(2005) and Sawan and Hamuda (2014) show that companies with higher growth levels 
are more willing to practice earnings management. In regards to REM, Roychowdhury 
(2006) and Carlson et al.s (1997) defend that growth creates a greater incentive towards 
these types of practices, providing evidence of a potential correlation between these 
variables. Capalbo et al. (2014) also proved that earnings management in SOEs increases 
with profitability. On the other hand, Gunny (2010) showed that profitability has a 
negative effect on earnings manipulation. In order to provide a greater representation of 
a firm’s performance and to encapsulate the multitude of opinions regarding its effect, it 
was included in the model the variables Growth is measured as the percentage variation 
of a company’s turnover, and ROA is obtained by dividing net income by total assets.  
Finally, the variables CrisisSOE and ListedSOE are interaction terms of the dummy 
variables SOE, Crisis and Listed. The first variable establishes a clear connection between 
periods of economic crisis and the extent of REM practices of SOE. The second variable 
establishes the connection between the influence of being publicly traded, in SOE, and its 
relationship to REM practices. 





5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables that compose the given 
model. 
Table I – Variables descriptive statistics 
  Count Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Size 98.725 5,00 4,94 0,64 3,07 7,06 
Debt 98.725 0,23 0,11 0,27 0,00 1,00 
Growth 98.725 0,06 0,02 737,92 -1,00 1,20 
ROA 98.725 0,074 0,06 0,12 -6,13 2,93 
CFO/A 98.725 0,17 0,15 0,27 -1,20 1,10 
1/A 98.725 0,000044 0,000012 0,0038 0,00 1,20 
S/A 98.725 1,09 0,73 1,56 0,00 221,70 
ChangS/A 98.725 0,09 0,006 1,07 -5,98 221,67 
CFONorm/A 98.725 -0,52 -0,36 1,26 -4,60 348,06 
AbnCF 98.725 0,69 0,59 1,30 -347,98 3,61 
 
The values do not present any distinguishing discrepancy and are in line with the 
results obtained by Cohen et al. (2008). In terms of the independent variables, the average 
level of debt (as a proportion of a firms’ total assets) is 23%, the average return on assets 
is 7,4% and the actual cash-flow from operations (as a proportion of the lagged assets) is, 
in average, positive (17%). 
5.2. T-student test for SOE and NSOE 
In order to understand the behaviour of both types of companies (non and state-owned) 
a t-student test was performed. This test allows the comparison of these two sub-samples 
and determines if their mean is statistically significant.  
Table II – T-student test 
  Observations Mean Abn CFO P-Value  df t Stat Conf Interval 
SOE 5.853 0,39 0,00     11.70 93,10 95% 
NSOE 92.872 0,71 0,00    185.74 -161,5 95% 
Considering the fact that the p-value for both SOE and NSOE is below 0,05, it is 
possible to state that these results reject the null hypothesis, in which the average of 
abnormal CFO for state-owned and non-state-owned companies. The results show, in 




fact, that the average value of abnormal CFO for both types of companies is quite 
different. 
5.3. Pearson’s correlation matrix 
The following table provides Pearson’s correlations among the variables: 
Table III – Pearson’s correlation matrix 
  Size Debt Growth ROA AbnCF 
Size 1     
Debt 0,080507 1    
Growth 0,007821 -0,00235 1   
ROA -0,03323 -0,10895 -0,00405 1  
AbnCF -0,06476 -0,16129 -0,00918 0,177488 1 
 
     In general, it is possible to conclude that the variables possess a weak correlation with 
each other, given the fact that the values of the matrix are close to zero. Additionally, 
some conclusions can be drawn regarding the variables themselves. The values obtained 
between the variables Debt and ROA demonstrate that companies with more debt have a 
smaller return on their assets.  
When observing the dependent variable, Abnormal CFO, there is a positive relation 
with the variable ROA and a negative relation with the remaining variables.  This 
indicates that firm’s that are smaller, more indebted, with less growth opportunities and 
higher return on assets have a greater level of abnormal CFO. 
5.4. Regression results 












Table IV – Model Regression 
  Expected Sign Abnormal CFO P-Value 
Intercept  1,29932 0,0000 
SOE +/- 0,24037 0,0000 
Crisis - 0,02622 0,0023 
Big4 - 0,05660 0,0000 
Listed +/- -0,04562 0,0011 
Size - -0,12563 0,0000 
Debt +/- -0,63661 0,0000 
Growth + -0,00001 0,0063 
ROA +/- 1,80105 0,0000 
CrisisSOE - -0,00417 0,9044 
ListedSOE +/- 0,16065 0,4819 
   
Nº Obs. 98.725 
R Square 0,057 








Note: The regression is a linear probability model. SOE is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the company is 
state-owned. Crisis is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the year is between 2009 and 2012. Listed is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the company is publicly traded. Big 4 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company is audited by a Big4 auditing firm. Size is measured as the logarithm of a company’s total assets. Debt is 
measured as the sum of long and short-term non-operational liabilities divided by the total assets. Growth is measured 
as the percentage variation of a company’s turnover. ROA is measured by dividing net income by total assets. 
CrisisSOE is an interaction variable between the variables Crisis and SOE. ListedSOE is an interaction variable between 
the variables Listed and SOE. 
 
It is possible to conclude that every variable, apart from the dummies CrisisSOE and 
ListedSOE, are statistically significant. The dummy SOE, whose coefficient is positive, 
suggests that state-owned companies demonstrate greater degrees of REM practices. The 
results follow the conclusions presented by Braam et al. (2015) and Bai et al. (2004), 
despite contradicting the results presented Wang and Yung (2011). The fact that these 
firms tend to prioritize the achievement of social goals and short-term political objectives, 
rather than maximizing profits, can have an effect on the degree of earnings management 
practices. 
In terms of the remaining values, the variable Big4 has a positive coefficient, which 
suggests that being audited by these firms leads to a greater degree of REM practices, 
because, as pointed  by Roychowdhury (2006), these firms have an increased scrutiny of 
accrual-based earnings management practices. The variable Crisis, which has a positive 
coefficient, suggests that there is an increased practice of REM in periods of economic 




recession, which is not consistent with the conclusions presented by Filip et al. (2014). 
Finally, the variable Listed has a negative coefficient which suggests that publicly traded 
firms incur in less REM practices. This conclusion concurs with the evidence presented 
by Givoly et al. (2010).  
Size has a negative coefficient, which provides evidence that smaller companies 
sustain greater levels of real earnings management, as demonstrated by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978). The variable debt has a negative coefficient. This leads to the 
conclusion that more indebted companies are more motivated to manipulate their 
earnings, as seen in Zamri, Rahman and Isa (2013) and is not consistent with 
Roychowdhury (2006). 
The variable Growth has a negative coefficient, which provides evidence that a 
company with greater growth opportunities incurs in a decreasing rate of EM practices, 
which is not consistent with Roychowdhury (2006). Additionally, the variable ROA has 
a positive coefficient, leading to the conclusion that a better management of a company’s 
assets leads to a decreased use of EM practices, which follows the conclusions presented 
by Carlson et al. (1997). However the results is not consistent with the conclusions 
obtained by Gunny (2010) and Cupertino et al. (2016) which assumed a negative 
relationship between these variables. 
Finally, the variables ListedSOE and CrisisSOE were shown not to be statistically 
significant. However, this does not refute the second hypothesis of the study, in which it 
was defended that crisis periods are positively associated with increased REM practices, 
thanks to the results obtained with the variable Crisis. Additionally, it is probable that the 
effects of crisis periods on the degree of REM practices are more directed toward non-
state-owned firms.  
       In sum, the results confirm the first hypothesis, which states that state-owned firms are 
positively associated with a greater degree of REM practices and, more specifically, in 
the form of manipulating the firm’s cash-flow from operations by, for example, granting 
excessive discounts.  
     Finally, it is important to state that a regression without the interaction variables was 
calculated and that the results previously presented were strengthened. This solidifies the 
conclusions obtained by this study – Appendix 5. 




6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
6.1. The effects of Swedish SOEs 
When analysing appendix 1 it is clear that the sample of state-owned companies is 
mainly composed of Swedish companies (about 64%), which may be a weakness of the 
sample obtained. Therefore, the following regressions was run excluding these firms. 
Table V presents the results. 









Nº Obs. 87.019 
R Square 0,049 
Adjusted R^2 0,049 
F-statistic 451,23 
P-value 0 
Note: The regression is a linear probability model. SOE is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the company is 
state-owned. Crisis is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the year is between 2009 and 2012. Listed is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the company is publicly traded. Big 4 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company is audited by a Big4 auditing firm. Size is measured as the logarithm of a company’s total assets. Debt is 
measured as the sum of long and short-term non-operational liabilities divided by the total assets. Growth is measured 
as the percentage variation of a company’s turnover. ROA is measured by dividing net income by total assets. 
CrisisSOE is an interaction variable between the variables Crisis and SOE. ListedSOE is an interaction variable between 
the variables Listed and SOE. 
As seen, the results obtained are statistically significant for the exact same variables 
as the previous regression. Additionally, the conclusions regarding each variable are the 
same or, in other words, the coefficients obtained have the same sign.  
  Expected Sign 
Abnormal 
CFO P-Value 
Intercept   1,32703 0,00000 
Crisis - -0,02559 0,00690 
Big4 - 0,06272 0,00000 
Listed +/- 0,03566 0,02289 
SOE +/- 0,30489 0,00000 
Size - -0,12947 0,00000 
Debt +/- -0,62977 0,00000 
Growth + -0,00002 0,00919 
ROA +/- 1,76983 0,00000 
CrisisSOE - 0,08820 0,17658 
ListedSOE +/- 0,20680 0,57704 




This provides evidence to sustain the robustness of the results and the conclusions 
obtained. The exclusion of Swedish companies (non and state-owned) showed to have no 
significant impact on the coefficients and the P-value of the model’s variables.  
6.2. The effects of growth opportunities 
Growth opportunities have been associated with a higher willingness to practice 
earnings managements (Tendeloo et al., 2005; Sawan et al., 2014). Additionally, 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Carlson et al. (1997) defend that growth creates a greater 
incentive towards the practice of REM. Therefore, it seems important to study more in 
depth the effects of growth opportunities. 
In order to study the effects of growth opportunities, two sub-samples were created, 
one in which the value of the variable growth was above its median (0,02) and another 
otherwise. Table VI summarizes the results.  
Table VI – The effects of growth opportunities 
 Expected 
Sign 
Growth Below Median Growth above Median 
 Coefficient P-Value Abnormal CFO P-Value 
Intercept   1,09759 0,00000 1,50904 0,00000 
SOE +/- 0,20361 0,00000 0,28065 0,00000 
Crisis - 0,03748 0,02583 0,01238 0,02361 
Big4 - 0,04780 0,00270 0,06494 0,00000 
Listed +/- 0,09862 0,00049 -0,00179 0,83672 
Size - -0,09148 0,00000 -0,15778 0,00000 
Debt +/- -0,54526 0,00000 -0,73360 0,00000 
Growth + 0,07423 0,03899 -0,00002 0,00000 
ROA +/- 1,69883 0,00000 1,80658 0,00000 
CrisisSOE - -0,03196 0,67381 0,02962 0,17474 
ListedSOE +/- 0,19312 0,67338 0,15104 0,28548 
      
  Nº Obs. 48.468 50.257  
  R Square 0,025 0,256  
  Adjusted R^2 0,025 0,256  
  F-statistic 126 1.731  
  P-value 0 0  
Note: The regression is a linear probability model. SOE is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the company is 
state-owned. Crisis is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the year is between 2009 and 2012. Listed is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the company is publicly traded. Big 4 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company is audited by a Big4 auditing firm. Size is measured as the logarithm of a company’s total assets. Debt is 
measured as the sum of long and short-term non-operational liabilities divided by the total assets. Growth is measured 
as the percentage variation of a company’s turnover. ROA is measured by dividing net income by total assets. 




CrisisSOE is an interaction variable between the variables Crisis and SOE. ListedSOE is an interaction variable between 
the variables Listed and SOE. 
 
When comparing both sub-samples, it is visible that the variable growth has an effect 
on certain variables. The first identifiable difference is in significance of the variable 
Listed, given the fact that, when considering the sub-sample in which the values of the 
variable growth are above its median, this variable is not statistically significant, leading 
to the conclusion that, when facing companies with vast growth opportunities, the fact 
that it is listed or not does not correlate with the extent of REM practices. 
Regarding the variable SOE, it is visible that its coefficient is greater when considering 
the sub-sample with values above median, which can may lead to the inference that state 
companies with greater growth opportunities are incur in higher degrees of earnings 
management practices. This may be in line with Ferreira et al. (2013), in which the authors 
state that politicians aim to report earnings that will demonstrate that the public resources 
are managed appropriately. Taking this account, larger growth opportunities might 
provide the necessary visibility to guarantee future re-election or, in other terms, job 
security. Additionally, the variable debt, whose coefficient is negative, also has a greater 
coefficient when considering the sub-sample above media. This may allow the conjecture 
that indebted firms with greater growth opportunities incur in higher degrees of REM 
practices. Finally, the variable size also sees an increase in its coefficient when regarding 
the same sub-sample. The conclusion that can be drawn is that smaller companies with 
greater growth opportunities also incur in more earnings management practices. 
In general, it is possible to determine that growth has a positive effect on the degree of 
earnings management, specifically through the use of REM. Additionally, one can 
postulate that this effect is more prominent in smaller companies, as they take advantage 
of these opportunities and, combined with the manipulation of the reported earnings, try 
to demonstrate a better performance. All in all, the results seem to align with the existing 
body of literature in demonstrating the key role that growth opportunities play in the 
decision to manage earnings. 





6.3. The effects of indebtedness 
Debt has been demonstrated to have an effect on the extent of earnings management 
practices (Zamri, Rahman and Isa, 2013). However, a consensus has yet to be formed in 
regards to the effect that this variable might have. Some state that there is a positive 
relationship between a firm’s debt level and the degree of earnings management practices 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), and some have shown the opposite (Zamri, Rahman and Isa, 
2013). As it is not clear the extent of the influence that this variable has on the degree of 
REM, it is important to study more in depth the overall effects of indebtedness. 
To achieve this two sub-samples were created, one in which the value of the variable 
debt was above its median (0,11) and another otherwise. Table VII presents the results. 
Table VII – The effects of indebtedness 
 Expected 
Sign 
Debt Below Median Debt above Median 
 Coefficient P-Value 
Abnormal 
CFO P-Value 
Intercept   1,27224 0,00000 1,40526 0,00000 
SOE +/- 0,26461 0,00000 0,21544 0,00000 
Crisis - 0,01997 0,22411 0,03010 0,00000 
Big4 - 0,08145 0,00000 0,04391 0,00000 
Listed +/- 0,02149 0,45695 -0,03175 0,00007 
Size - -0,13142 0,00000 -0,12693 0,00000 
Debt +/- 0,88089 0,00100 -0,78943 0,00000 
Growth + -0,00001 0,25868 -0,00002 0,00000 
ROA +/- 1,88010 0,00000 1,62631 0,00000 
CrisisSOE - 0,03324 0,66896 -0,01820 0,31855 
ListedSOE +/- 0,09711 0,82145 0,20598 0,13268 
      
  Nº Obs. 49.283 49.442  
  R Square 0,023 0,238  
  Adjusted R^2 0,023 0,238  
  F-statistic 116 1.544  
  P-value 0 0  
Note: The regression is a linear probability model. SOE is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the company is 
state-owned. Crisis is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the year is between 2009 and 2012. Listed is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the company is publicly traded. Big 4 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company is audited by a Big4 auditing firm. Size is measured as the logarithm of a company’s total assets. Debt is 
measured as the sum of long and short-term non-operational liabilities divided by the total assets. Growth is measured 
as the percentage variation of a company’s turnover. ROA is measured by dividing net income by total assets. 




CrisisSOE is an interaction variable between the variables Crisis and SOE. ListedSOE is an interaction variable between 
the variables Listed and SOE. 
The effect of the variable debt is visible on certain variables. The first identifiable 
difference is in significance of the variables Crisis, Listed and Growth, given the fact that, 
when considering the sub-sample in which the values of the variable Growth is below its 
median, this variable is not statistically significant. 
Regarding the variable Crisis, it is visible that its coefficient is greater when 
considering the sub-sample with values above median, which may lead to the conclusion 
that companies with greater debt levels incur in higher degrees of earnings management 
when facing a crisis period. On the contrary, the variable SOE has a decreasing coefficient 
when considering the sub-sample above median, which may permit the determination that 
state-companies with higher debt levels use less REM practices. 
Overall, the results align with the literature that states that debt has a negative effect 
on the degree of EM. This may be due to the fact that higher debt levels lead to a greater 
scrutiny by financial institutions, leading to a decreased leeway to manage earnings. This 
effect may be increased when regarding SOE companies, that already face different types 
of pressures, such as pressures from the public. It seems as though the debt level decreases 
the degree of tolerance in regards to these practices, as seen by the results obtained.  
7. CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this study was to determine if there is a greater extent of REM 
in SOEs or NSOEs. In order to achieve, an empirical model was developed using the 
variable abnormal CFO, which was calculated based on the Royhowdhury (2006) 
methodology. The sample is composed of 15.147 companies from the years 2008 to 2017. 
The results suggest that state-owned companies practice a greater extend of REM than 
their non-state-owned counterparts. Additionally, characteristics such as the firms’ size, 
debt level and growth opportunities were seen as influencing the degree of these practices. 
Overall, the study concluded that there is a greater extend of REM in small state-owned 
companies with a lesser degree of debt and with fewer growth opportunities. Also, the 
study determined that there is an increased practice of REM in periods of economic 
recession. 




The conclusions presented by this study contribute to the existing body of literature, 
given the fact that that it enabled the conjugation of two underdeveloped topics, the study 
of REM practices and their extent in state-owned firms. It may also interesting for 
regulatory bodies, as a way to help create better legislation regarding the management of 
state-owned companies and public resources. An additional contribution is associated to 
the fact that the sample analyses the variables in an assortment of different territories in 
Europe, which can lead to more representative results. 
The major limitations of the study are associated with the fact that the time-span of 
data does not include years before the crisis of 2008, and only reflects the effects of 
posterior years.  
In terms of future research, it would be interesting to study about the degrees of REM 
practices in other areas of the world and compare with the results obtained in Europe. The 
geographic location can play a major role in REM and the results can be quite different. 
For example, it would be interesting to contrast the results obtained in China with those 
obtained in the US, given the fact that, in China, the state owns a vast amount of 
companies. 
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Appendix 1 – Sample distribution by country 
 
Country 
NSOE SOE Total 
Nº companies Percentage Nº companies Percentage Nº companies Percentage 
Austria 5 0.035% 11 1.11% 16 0.11% 
Belgium 863 6.1% 123 12.36% 986 6.51% 
Bulgaria 17 0.12% 0 0% 17 0.11% 
C.Republic 75 0.53% 0 0% 75 0.50% 
Denmark 1.872 13.2% 131 13.17% 2.003 13.22% 
Finland 459 3.2% 10 1.01% 469 3.10% 
France 2.014 14.2% 0 0% 2.014 13.30% 
Germany 398 2.8% 49 4.92% 447 2.95% 
Greece 38 0.27% 0 0% 38 0.25% 
Hungary 191 1.35% 0 0% 191 1.26% 
Ireland 76 0.54% 0 0% 76 0.50% 
Italy 1.766 12.48% 0 0% 1.766 11.66% 
Luxembourg 58 0.41% 0 0% 58 0.38% 
Netherlands 690 4.88% 0 0% 690 4.56% 
Norway 170 1.20% 0 0% 170 1.12% 
Poland 44 0.31% 0 0% 44 0.29% 
Portugal 77 0.54% 0 0% 77 0.51% 
United Kingdom 3.759 26.56% 12 1.21% 3.771 24.90% 
Romania 10 0.071% 0 0% 10 0.07% 
Spain 425 3.0% 18 1.81% 443 2.92% 
Sweden 1.133 8.01% 641 64.42% 1.774 11.71% 
Switzerland 12 0.085% 0 0% 12 0.08% 


















Appendix 2 – List of sectors of activity in the sample 
 
NAICS  Industry 
1 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 
2 Utilities, construction and mining/oil extraction 
3 Manufacturing 
4 Wholesal, retail and transportation 
5 Information, professional services, management of companies and administrative support 
6 Educational services, health care 
7 Arts, accommodation and food services 
8 Other Services (except Public Administration) 
 
 
Appendix 3 – Sample distribution by sector of activity 
   
NAICS 
SOE NSOE Total 
Nº companies Percentage Nº companies Percentage Nº companies Percentage 
1 14 1.4% 104 0.70% 118 0.80% 
2 198 19.9% 1.838 13.% 2.036 13.4% 
3 15 1.5% 2.565 18.1% 2.580 17.0% 
4 64 6.4% 2.306 16.3% 2.370 15.6% 
5 604 60.7% 6.662 47.1% 7.266 48.0% 
6 23 2.3% 23 1.0% 166 1.10% 
7 58 5.8% 58 3.0% 486 3.20% 
8 19 1.9% 19 0.7% 125 0.80% 
Grand total 995 14.152 15.147 



















Yes % No % Yes % No % 
Austria 2 0,1% 4 0,03% 3 0,04% 3 0,04% 
Belgium 124 8,6% 1.045 7,6% 605 7,2% 564 8,4% 
Bulgaria 5 0,3% 12 0,09% 2 0,02% 15 0,2% 
C.Republic 10 0,7% 92 0,7% 59 0,7% 43 0,6% 
Denmark 41 2,8% 820 6,0% 672 7,97% 189 2,8% 
Finland 35 2,4% 445 3,2% 276 3,3% 204 3,0% 
France 241 16,7% 2.068 15,1% 1.098 13,% 1.211 18,0% 
Germany 58 4,0% 486 3,5% 312 3,7% 232 3,5% 
Greece 17 1,2% 27 0,2% 22 0,3% 22 0,3% 
Hungary 21 1,5% 214 1,6% 122 1,45% 113 1,7% 
Ireland 8 0,6% 48 0,4% 40 0,5% 16 0,2% 
Italy 192 13,3% 1.815 13,2% 953      11,3%    1.054 15,7% 
Luxembourg 4 0,3% 40 0,3% 22 0,3% 22 0,3% 
Netherlands 51 3,5% 511 3,7% 315 3,7% 247 3,7% 
Norway 13 0,9% 148 1,1% 95 1,1% 66 1,0% 
Poland 7 0,5% 45 0,3% 26 0,3% 26 0,4% 
Portugal 7 0,5% 71 0,5% 42 0,5% 36 0,5% 
United Kingdom 337 23,4% 3.489 25,5% 2.313 27,4% 1.513 22,5% 
Romania 4 0,3% 11 0,1% 11 0,13% 4 0,06% 
Spain 65 4,5% 449 3,3% 289 3,4% 225 3,3% 
Sweden 195 13,5% 1.852 13,5% 1.141 13,5% 906 13,5% 
Switzerland 3 0,2% 15 0,1% 10 0,12% 8 0,1% 
Grand Total 1.440 100% 13.707 100% 8.428 100% 6.719 100% 




Appendix 5 – Model regression without interaction variables 
 
  Expected Sign Abnormal CFO P-Value 
Intercept   1,405057 0,000 
SOE +/- 0,22197 0,000 
Crisis - 0,02867 0,000 
Big4 - 0,04398 0,000 
Listed +/- -0,03235 0,000 
Size - -0,12678 0,000 
Debt +/- -0,78981 0,000 
Growth + -0,00002 0,000 
ROA +/- 1,62697 0,000 
 
Nº Obs. 98.725 
R Square 0,238 
Adjusted R^2 0,237 
F-statistic 1929,5 
P-value 0,000 
Note: The regression is a linear probability model. SOE is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the company is 
state-owned. Crisis is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the year is between 2009 and 2012. Listed is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the company is publicly traded. Big 4 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company is audited by a Big4 auditing firm. Size is measured as the logarithm of a company’s total assets. Debt is 
measured as the sum of long and short-term non-operational liabilities divided by the total assets. Growth is measured 
as the percentage variation of a company’s turnover. ROA is measured by dividing net income by total assets. 
